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Preference is given to letters commenting on contributions published recently in the JRSM.
They should not exceed 300 words and should be typed double spaced Medical scientism I read Mr Leggett's condemnation of 'medical scientism' (February 1997 JRSM, pp 99-1 O 1 ) with sympathy for his insistence that medical practice should be centred on the needs of the patient, but think that the apparent conflict between a scientific approach to medicine and regard for the patient's feelings and autonomy arises from two main causes: (1) a false idea of scientific method; and (2) uncritical acceptance into medical discourse of the idea, implicit in colloquial speech, that the names of diseases refer to causes of illness.
1. The dogmatic attitude of mind which Leggett calls scientism is impossible for those who accept Popper's view of scientific method as hypothetico-deductive l,2 . For them, science is an exciting intellectual endeavour by which truth may be approached. The resulting scientific knowledge is not an immutable set of truths, but a set of hypotheses which have been submitted to and survived crucial tests; each of these remains open to critical discussion, which may lead to a revised hypothesis, in its turn to be exposed to critical tests. Nothing could better illustrate this than the history of medicine.
2. In colloquial speech, people are said to become ill because they have been attacked by a disease, which is regarded as some sort of causal agent; the doctor's function is to identify the disease and apply the appropriate treatment for that disease; treatment is commonly said to be 'of the disease'. But when a disease terminology is used in informed medical discourse, its implications are very different. Diagnostic statements in the disease terminology are a convenient way of expressing concisely the conclusions of a diagnostic process that starts from recognition of a pattern of symptoms and signs (syndrome) and attempts to unravel the chain of causation leading to it. It may get no further than recognition of a syndrome, which conveys no positive causal implication; it may identify an underlying abnormality of structure or function, which may be corrected or alleviated whether or not its cause is ascertainable; or it may identify some external or inborn causal agent or process. Thus, a medical diagnosis conveys very varied causal implications. These considerations are summarized in the following statement, which does not attempt the impossible task of saying what diseases are, but sets forth the factual implications of a diagnosis in the disease terminology:
'In scientific discourse, the name of a disease refers to the sum of the abnormalities observed in a group of living organisms in association with a specified characteristic or set of characteristics by which they differ from the norm for their species in such a way as to place them at a biological disadvantage.' I have discussed the justification for, and the implications of, this statement else-where3 6. It recognizes the very varied causal implications of medical diagnosis, and thus avoids the error of regarding diseases as a class of causes of illness. It escapes circularity by relying on comparison with observable norms. It allows for changes in defining characteristics with increases in knowledge, which may lead to the displacement of older names by new ones. It makes medical practice necessarily holistic, recognizing that without patients there could be no diseases, and that we are treating the patient, not the disease. It clarifies the varied aims of treatment. We can always give supportive advice and information and do our best to relieve symptoms; we may be able to correct or ameliorate abnormalities of structure or function; and, if we have knowledge of causal agents or mechanisms, we may be able to remove or modify them. In decisions about both investigation and treatment, we have to make informed value judgments which we may hope will increasingly be guided by evidence from statistically valid trials. In these judgments, the circumstances of the individual patient must play a part.
All this seems to me to be entirely compatible with, and indeed dependent upon, a scientific approach-certainly for those who accept a Popperian view of scientific method. While we may condemn dogmatic 'scientism', we must not depart from a truly scientific approach to medicine. Lancet 1996; 348:594-6 May I comment on Mr Leggett's fascinating paper? We need 'ideas men' who will propound hypotheses. They (or someone else) need to test such hypotheses. This is the essential scientific role of Doubting Thomas. Valid testing may show a hypothesis sound or flawed. If found flawed, it must be abandoned publicly at least for the time being. If found sound it must be adopted as fact, or challenged by further testing (subject to ethical acceptability). He who fails to adjust his practice and teaching reveals himself as a faith healer rather than as a scientist. He who presents his faith as proven fact is an intellectual crook, deserving to be shunned. If we are to make real progress, all must accept that truth is ever transient. Many years ago, a senior member of the fledgling College of General Practitioners complained bitterly that, as a result of the introduction of the NHS, the general practitioner (GP) would become 'no more than a sign-post'. As science advances, this is surely one of the most important things he can do, remaining as close confidant of his patients and steering them in the right direction. The pre-eminent need of most patients is to know and trust a person in the medical chain surely the GP. If they are to be well attended to, the science must come second. This requires adjustment of teaching of the whole medical profession. John K Paterson Les Fitayes, 13640 La Roque D'Anth6ron, France
Group B streptococcal vulvovaginitis
The report by Noel and Galloway (December 1996 JRSM, pp705-706) on group B streptococcal (GBS) infection in mother and
